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Note
JOHNSON V. CALIFORNIA: SETTING A CONSTITUTIONAL
TRAP FOR PRISON OFFICIALS
In Johnson v. California,1 the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered the appropriate standard of review for an equal-protection chal-
lenge to a California Department of Corrections (CDC) policy that
assigned inmates to temporary double cells primarily according to
race. The Court held that strict scrutiny governed judicial review of
racial classifications in prisons and expressly rejected the deferential
Turner v. Safey2 standard.' Although the Court properly applied pre-
cedent in requiring strict scrutiny,4 its narrow holding effectively dis-
couraged prison officials from appropriately addressing racial
violence and endangered prisoners in three major ways. 5 First, the
Court failed to sufficiently address the real risk of racial violence at
the root of the CDC policy and consequently cast doubt on the pol-
icy's legitimacy.6 Second, the Court expressly withheld deference to
prison officials and instead required an inflexible rather than deferen-
tial approach to strict scrutiny, suggesting that justifying such policies
will be difficult.7 Third, the Court's decision to remand rather than
evaluate the constitutionality of the policy left prison officials with lit-
tle guidance and further exacerbated the risk that existing safety mea-
sures implicating race will be abandoned.8 The result of the Court's
limited holding is that prison officials may be forced to choose be-
tween violating the Fourteenth or the Eighth Amendment.9
Instead of restricting its holding by ordering the application of
strict scrutiny upon remand, the Court should have followed its ap-
proach in Grutter v. Bollinger1° and instantly applied a deferential ver-
1. 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005).
2. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
3. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1151.
4. See infra Part W.A.
5. See infta Part IV.B.
6. See infra Part IV.B.1.
7. See infra Part IV.B.2.
8. See infra Part IV.B.3.
9. See infra Part IV.B.4.
10. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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sion of strict scrutiny to the CDC policy."' Or, at the very least, the
Court should have expressed that a measure of deference ought to be
afforded to prison officials when applying strict scrutiny to racial clas-
sifications in prisons. 2 Either approach would have strengthened
prisoners' Fourteenth Amendment rights without simultaneously
weakening prison security."i
I. THE CASE
In 1995, when entering the California prison system, new and
newly transferred male inmates were initially housed in reception cen-
ters for up to sixty days.14 While undergoing evaluations to determine
their ultimate placements, the CDC temporarily assigned the prison-
ers to single cells, dormitories, or double cells at the reception cen-
ters. 1 5  Prisoners who did not present special security concerns
warranting a single cell but who could not be safely housed in a dor-
mitory were housed in double cells.' 6 The CDC employed an unwrit-
ten policy of using race as the dominant consideration when assigning
inmates to their temporary quarters."1 Prison administrators gener-
ally divided inmates into four racial categories-black, white, Asian,
and other-and then further subdivided the inmates within each ra-
cial group."8 Under the policy, an inmate had close to zero chance of
being assigned a cellmate of a different race. 19
According to the CDC, racially segregating double cells was nec-
essary because its prisons were dominated by violent gangs.2" Such
gangs, including the Aryan Brotherhood, the Black Guerrilla Family,
the Mexican Mafia, the Nazi Low Riders, and La Nuestra Familia, or-
11. See infra Part IV.C.; see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (reviewing Michigan Law
School's admissions policy under strict scrutiny but deferring to school administrators' as-
sessment that diversity is a compelling interest).
12. See infra Part IV.C.
13. See infra Part IV.C.
14. Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1144 (2005).
15. Id at 1158 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
16. Id.
17. Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 2003). Factors for double-cell
assignments included "gender, age, classification score, case concerns, custody concerns,
mental and physical health, enemy situations, gang affiliation, background, history, cus-
tody designation, and race." Id,
18. Id. For example, Hispanics from Northern California were separated from Hispan-
ics from Southern California. Id. Japanese and Chinese inmates were generally not
housed together; Laotians, Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Filipinos were also usually sepa-
rated. Id.
19. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1144.
20. Id, at 1158 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
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ganized themselves along racial lines.2' The CDC claimed that hous-
ing inmates without regard to race would have created a threat to
prison discipline and inmate safety.22 The CDC further justified its
policy based on the private nature of the cells.23 Because guards
could not see into the cells without going up to them and inmates
could easily cover cell windows, the CDC contended, double cells
presented a greater risk of racial violence than public areas.24 The
rest of the CDC's facilities were fully integrated. 25
In June 1987, Garrison Johnson entered the custody of the CDC
and began serving a sentence for murder, robbery, and assault with a
deadly weapon. 26 Johnson, an African American, was subsequently
transferred to several different CDC facilities.27 Upon his arrival and
with each successive transfer, Johnson was assigned to a double cell
with another African-American inmate.28
In February 1995, Johnson filed a pro se complaint in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California.29 Johnson
contended that by assigning him cellmates on the basis of race, the
CDC violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.30
In January 1998, the district court dismissed Johnson's complaint for
failure to state a claim.3 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the
case in March 2000, holding that Johnson's complaint sufficiently
stated a claim for racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.32 Johnson was then appointed counsel and granted
leave to amend his complaint.33 In July 2000, Johnson filed his fourth
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1158-59.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1145 (majority opinion).
26. Id at 1157 (Thomas & Scalia,JJ., dissenting).
27. Id. at 1158.
28. Id. at 1145 (majority opinion).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 2003).
32. Id.
33. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1145. Like his initial complaint, Johnson's fourth amended
complaint alleged that the CDC's policy of racially segregating inmates violated his consti-
tutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
Johnson sought monetary damages from former CDC Directors James Rowland and James
Gomez for their roles in establishing and enforcing the policy. Id. In addition, he sought
injunctive relief against former CDC Director Stephen Cambra. Id. Rowland was CDC
Director from 1987 to 1991; Gomez from 1991 through the filing of Johnson's second
amended complaint. Id. By 2000, Stephen Cambra had stepped into the role. Id,
2006] 273
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amended complaint in district court.14 The district court ultimately
granted the prison officials' motion for summary judgment on quali-
fied-immunity grounds. 5 Johnson again appealed to the Ninth
Circuit.
3 6
In February 2003, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
ruling and held that the CDC's reception-center policy did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause.37 Applying the deferential Turner stan-
dard of review, the Ninth Circuit held that the CDC's policy was rea-
sonably related to the prison officials' goal of preventing racial
violence.38 The court further held that Johnson failed to carry the
"heavy burden" of proving that prison officials acted
unconstitutionally.
39
The Ninth Circuit subsequently denied Johnson's petition for re-
hearing en banc in July 2003.40 In his dissent,41 Judge Fergusen ar-
gued that the panel's decision ignored the Supreme Court's oft-
repeated and unmistakable rule that courts must review all racial clas-
sifications using strict scrutiny.4 2 He further maintained that the Tur-
ner standard does not apply when the constitutional right asserted is
consistent with legitimate penal goals.43 The Supreme Court granted
34. Id. Discovery ensued and both parties moved for summary judgment. Johnson, 321
F.3d at 795. Both parties' motions for summary judgment on the equal-protection claim
were denied. Id,
35. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1145-46. Although the district court first denied the adminis-
trators' motion for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, Rowland and
Gomez successfully moved for reconsideration after the United States Supreme Court de-
cided Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). Johnson, 321 F.3d at 795. In Saucier, the Court
considered the proper approach for determining whether a government official is entitled
to qualified immunity. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. The Saucier Court held that courts must
consider whether, viewed in a light most favorable to the victim, a constitutional right
would have been violated based on the facts asserted. Id. If so, courts must next address
whether the constitutional right was clearly established based on the specific facts of the
case. Id. Based on the Saucier decision, the district court in Johnson granted the administra-
tors' motion for summary judgment because their acts did not clearly violate the Constitu-
tion. Johnson, 321 F.3d at 795.
36. Johnson, 321 F.3d at 795-96.
37. Id. at 807.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Johnson v. California, 336 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2003).
41. Circuit Judges Pregerson, Nelson, and Reinhardt joined in dissent. Id. at 1117
(Fergusen, Pregerson, Nelson & Reinhardt, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1122 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
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certiorari to determine whether strict scrutiny or the Turner standard
of review applies to racial classifications in prisons.
44
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Racial classifications in the prison context implicate three distinct
standards of review under the United States Supreme Court's Four-
teenth and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.4 5 First, to evaluate
whether government-imposed race-based measures violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court subjects
such classifications, whether they burden or benefit racial groups, to
strict scrutiny.46 Second, the Court has crafted a specific rational-basis
test for prisoners' constitutional claims that are incompatible with
proper incarceration. 47 Finally, the Court has articulated a third stan-
dard for prisoners' claims under the Eighth Amendment focusing on
whether prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference."48
A. Evolution of the Strict Scrutiny Standard of Review for
Government-Imposed Racial Classifications
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws."49 Soon after the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted in 1868, the Supreme Court narrowly inter-
preted the Equal Protection Clause as only protecting African Ameri-
cans from discriminatory state laws. 50 Although the application of the
Equal Protection Clause has since broadened, the Court has long held
that the core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to eradicate
all government-imposed discrimination based on race.5'
In accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose of
eliminating racial discrimination, the Supreme Court only permits ra-
cial classifications to stand if the government can prove that such dis-
crimination is necessary to accomplish a compelling governmental
44. Johnson v. California, 540 U.S. 1217 (2004);Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141,
1146 (2005).
45. See infra Parts IA-C.
46. See infra Part II.A.
47. See infta Part II.B.
48. See infra Part II.C.
49. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
50. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873) (stating that the
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to protect newly emancipated blacks from laws
that discriminated against them as a class); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-07
(1879) (same).
51. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
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interest.5 2 Known as strict scrutiny, this test was first applied to a clas-
sification based on national origin in Korematsu v. United States,53 in
which the Court decided that Congress and the Executive did not ex-
ceed their war powers by excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry
from the West Coast war area. Writing for the Court, Justice Black
noted that legal restrictions which infringe upon a single racial
group's civil rights are "immediately suspect."5 4 He further explained
that while not all classifications burdening a single racial group are
unconstitutional, courts must subject such restrictions to "the most
rigid scrutiny."5 5 Indeed, although the Court upheld the use of war
powers in Korematsu,5 6 the case laid the groundwork for the applica-
tion of strict scrutiny to all classifications burdening racial or ethnic
groups.5 7
Following Korematsu, however, the Court did not consistently ap-
ply strict scrutiny in every case in which governmental action impli-
cated race. For example, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court
based its holding that segregated schools violate the Equal Protection
Clause on the social and psychological harms caused by segregation in
education, not on a strict-scrutiny analysis.5" In the 1960s, the Court
returned to the strict judicial review of Korematsu by expanding the
scope of strict-scrutiny analysis as applied to racial measures. In Lov-
ing v. Virginia, for instance, the Court extended strict scrutiny to a
Virginia law banning interracial marriage despite the state's protest
that the law equally burdened whites and minorities.5 9 The Court re-
jected the argument that a law containing a racial classification could
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because it had "equal applica-
52. Id at 432-33.
53. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The origin of strict scrutiny has also been traced to footnote
four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See, e.g., Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287-88 (1978) (citing footnote four of Carolene
Products to support the petitioner's argument that strict scrutiny should be applied to classi-
fications that burden "discrete and insular minorities").
54. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
55. Id. Justice Black also acknowledged that while public necessity may occasionally
present a valid reason to infringe upon a single racial group's civil rights, racial antagonism
is never a permissible justification for doing so. Id.
56. Id. at 219.
57. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (noting that Kore-
matsu demonstrates that even strict scrutiny can fail to root out an illegitimate racial
classification).
58. 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954). Chief Justice Warren, writing for a unanimous Court,
overruled Plesry v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) and rejected the notion that segregated
public schools could ever be separate but equal. Id.
59. 388 U.S. 1, 8, 11 (1967).
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tion."6° Citing Korematsu, the Loving Court analyzed the miscegena-
tion statute under strict scrutiny and held that the law violated the
Equal Protection Clause. 61
One year after Loving, the Court in Lee v. Washington62 appeared
to apply heightened scrutiny to desegregation in the prison context.
Lee involved a state challenge to an Alabama federal district court de-
cree that a desegregation schedule be established for the state's pris-
ons and jails.6" The Court's brief per curiam opinion rejected the
state's protest that the district court's order did not allow for the re-
quirements of prison security and discipline and held only that the
order should not be interpreted in that manner.64 Justices Black,
Harlan, and Stewart concurred to make explicit that "prison authori-
ties have the right, acting in good faith and in particularized circum-
stances, to take into account racial tensions in maintaining security,
discipline, and good order in prisons and jails."6 Although the ma-
jority opinion in Lee did not openly state the standard of review that it
applied to Alabama's complaint, lower courts went on to subject
prison-segregation policies to a heightened standard of review.
66
From the late 1970s to the 1990s, the Court broadened its appli-
cation of strict scrutiny in equal-protection cases by extending the
standard to affirmative-action measures. Initially, however, the Court
struggled with the proper standard of review for remedial racial classi-
fications, failing to produce a majority opinion in three cases and leav-
ing the issue unresolved.67 In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,68 the
60. Id at 8.
61. Id. at 11-12.
62. 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam).
63. Lee, 390 U.S. at 333.
64. Id. at 333-34.
65. Id. (Black, Harlan & Stewart, JJ., concurring).
66. See, e.g., Sockwell v. Phelps, 20 F.3d 187, 191-92 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Lee for the
proposition that a vague fear of racial violence is not a sufficient justification for wholesale
racial segregation and holding that a Texas prison-system policy of racially segregating
double cells violated the Equal Protection Clause); see also Black v. Lane, 824 F.2d 561 (7th
Cir. 1987) (invoking strict scrutiny to reverse summary judgment on a prisoner's racial
discrimination claim); United States v. Wyandotte County, 480 F.2d 969 (10th Cir. 1973)
(holding that vague fears of racial violence are not enough tojustify racially segregated jail
facilities).
67. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 219-21 (1995) (recounting
the Court's struggle to produce a majority opinion in three cases that addressed whether to
apply strict scrutiny to remedial race-based measures). First, in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, the Court addressed the proper level of scrutiny to review a state medi-
cal school's affirmative-action admissions policy. 438 U.S. 265, 287-91 (1978) (plurality
opinion). Although Bakke did not result in a majority opinion, Justices Powell and White
took the position that racial classifications merit strict scrutiny. Id. at 291. Four Justices,
however, concluded that remedial race-based measures should be subjected to intermedi-
2006]
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Court resolved the question of the proper standard of review for re-
medial race-based measures imposed by state and local govern-
ments.6' At issue was a remedial plan adopted by the Richmond City
Council requiring that minority business owners be awarded a per-
centage of public construction contracts.7 0 Writing for the majority,
Justice O'Connor declared that without employing the most searching
judicial review, there is no way to properly distinguish remedial racial
measures from classifications that are founded in ideas of racial inferi-
ority or that stem from racial politics. 7 1 Justice O'Connor further ex-
plained that the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" improper
racial classifications and ensure that the government's goal is suffi-
ciently important to merit use of such a drastic tool. 72 The Croson
Court held that strict scrutiny is required for both remedial and dis-
criminatory racial classifications.73
While Croson clarified the proper standard of review for state and
local governments, the Court did not explicitly extend its holding to
similar actions taken by the federal government under the Fifth
Amendment74 until its decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia.75
ate scrutiny. Id. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun,JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). It is unclear what standard of review Justice White believed should
govern. Christopher S. Miller, End Jnstifies the Means: Affirmative Action, Standards of Review,
and Justice White, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1305, 1307 n.17 (1992).
Second, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, the Court again failed to produce a majority opinion
in a case involving an equal-protection challenge to a federal "minority business enter-
prise" set-aside provision. 448 U.S. 448, 454 (1980) (plurality opinion). The plurality ap-
plied a two-part test that purported to differ from any of the tests articulated in Bakke and
upheld the constitutionality of the provision. Id. at 492.
Third, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,the Court issued a plurality opinion in
which it used strict scrutiny to evaluate a school board's use of race-based preferences in a
lay-off provision. 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (plurality opinion). The Wygant Court held
that the lay-off provision violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was not narrowly
tailored and there were less invasive means of accomplishing racial equality. Id. at 283-84.
68. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
69. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 221-22 (explaining that Croson partially resolved the issue
of the proper standard of review for remedial race-based measures).
70. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477.
71. Id. at 493.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 494. The Croson Court further held that the City of Richmond failed to set
forth sufficient evidence to support a finding that there was a compelling governmental
interest or that the city's plan was narrowly tailored. Id. at 500, 507. Thus, the Court held
that the Richmond Plan violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 511.
74. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 222 (explaining that Croson did not enunciate the proper
standard of review for federal government-imposed race-based action). Despite its pro-
nouncement in Croson, the Court was not yet prepared to fully embrace strict scrutiny for
all official racial conduct. Id. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), the
Court unexpectedly retreated from its long-standing view that the Equal Protection Clause
imposes the same duty on the federal government as it imposes on the states. Id. at 225.
[VOL. 65:271
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In Adarand, the Court addressed a federal affirmative-action program
providing general contractors with financial incentives to hire subcon-
tractors controlled by people from socially and economically disadvan-
taged backgrounds.76 The Adarand Court unequivocally declared that
all racial classifications imposed by any governmental entity-federal,
state, or local-must be reviewed under strict scrutiny.77 Hence, the
Court explained, for race-based measures to survive strict scrutiny and
pass constitutional muster, such classifications must be narrowly tai-
lored to further compelling governmental interests.7 1
In future decisions, the Court embraced Adarands strict-scrutiny
rule but further explored the types of governmental interests consid-
ered compelling and the types of policies considered narrowly tai-
lored. In Gratz v. Bollinger,9 the Court applied strict scrutiny to the
University of Michigan's admissions policy of automatically granting a
set number of points to bolster the admissions scores of under-
represented minority applicants. The Gratz Court held that because
the admissions policy failed to show individual consideration and in-
stead simply used race as the determinative factor, it was not narrowly
tailored to serve the asserted compelling interest in educational diver-
sity and thus was unconstitutional.8 0
In the companion case to Gratz, Grutter v. Bollinger,"l the Court
upheld the Michigan Law School's admissions policy. The policy at
issue in Grutter required admissions officials to consider "soft vari-
ables" in addition to the applicant's grade point average and law
school admission test (LSAT) score.8 2 The policy also enabled admis-
sions officials to accord "substantial weight" to applicants who would
contribute to the school's diversity, including, but not restricted to, its
Metro Broadcasting dealt with the constitutionality of two Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) minority-preference policies. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 552. The Metro Broad-
casting Court held that unlike remedial measures imposed by state and local governments,
those imposed by the federal government need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny to be
found constitutional. Id. at 564-65.
75. 515 U.S. at 227. Recognizing that its decision in Metro Broadcasting undermined
established principles in the Court's equal-protection jurisprudence, the Adarand Court
overruled the case five years later. Id. at 226-27.
76. Id. at 204.
77. Id. at 227.
78. Id.
79. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
80. Id. at 271-72, 275.
81. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
82. Id. at 315. Such "soft variables" included the quality of an applicant's recommenda-
tions, the undergraduate institutions attended, an applicant's personal essay, and an appli-
cant's chosen coursework. Id.
2006]
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racial and ethnic diversity."3 The plaintiff, a white Michigan resident
who was first wait-listed and then rejected from the law school, alleged
that the school's admission policy was racially discriminatory in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor reviewed the justifica-
tions for imposing strict scrutiny and noted at the outset that context
is important when reviewing governmental racial classifications.8 5
Next, Justice O'Connor announced that the law school had a compel-
ling interest in student-body diversity.8 6 In reaching its decision, the
Court deferred to the law school's expertise and to its position that
diversity is a critical aspect of its educational mission.8 7 Citing the
Court's tradition of according a measure of deference to universities
on academic issues, Justice O'Connor emphasized that the strict-scru-
tiny test was not diluted by deferring to the university officials' exper-
tise in the complicated realm of education.88 The Court then upheld
the constitutionality of the policy, finding it narrowly tailored to fur-
ther a compelling interest in diversity because it provided for a highly
individualized consideration of each application and did not unduly
burden members of other racial groups.89
Thus, post-Adarand, the Court has accepted the rule that strict
scrutiny is the proper standard of review for all government-imposed
racial classifications.9" However, the Court has yet to expressly extend
Grutter's deferential strict scrutiny to other areas outside of the educa-
tion context where deference is traditionally granted.9"
83. Id. at 316. Although there was no requirement that a certain percentage of minor-
ity students be admitted, the director of admissions kept careful track of the racial and
ethnic composition of the class to ensure that a "critical mass" of minority students was
admitted to ensure student-body diversity. Id. at 318.
84. Id. at 316-17.
85. Id. at 322-27.
86. Id. at 328.
87. Id
88. Id.
89. Id. at 334, 337, 341. Not all of the Justices in Grutter agreed with the majority's
decision to include a deferential component to strict scrutiny. In a dissent joined in parts
by justice Scalia, Justice Thomas declared the majority's deference to university administra-
tors "unprecedented" and "antithetical to strict scrutiny." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 362 (Thomas
& Scalia,JJ., dissenting).
90. See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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B. Evolution of the Turner Standard for Prisoners' Constitutional Claims
Regarding Rights Incompatible with Proper Incarceration
As the Court grappled with whether to extend strict scrutiny to
remedial classifications, it established a separate line of precedent that
dealt with prisoners' constitutional challenges. Traditionally, federal
courts did not interfere with the internal affairs of prisons.9 2 Courts
generally accepted that a prisoner was a "slave of the State," stripped
of all personal rights except those that the law chose to extend.9 3 The
modem Court, however, has recognized that prisoners do not surren-
der all constitutional protections upon incarceration.9 4 Among the
prisoners' rights retained are the right to be free from racial discrimi-
nation under the Equal Protection Clause9 5 and the right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment.9 6 The modern Court has also acknowledged that cer-
tain constitutional rights must be withdrawn or limited because of law-
ful incarceration, as well as legitimate penological goals such as
deterrence, rehabilitation, and prison security.
97
Beginning in the 1970s with Procunier v. Martinez,9" the Court be-
gan to develop its modem framework for analyzing prisoners' consti-
tutional claims.9 9 In Martinez, the Court was confronted with prison
regulations that censored inmate correspondence. 0 0 The Court de-
cided to review the regulations using strict scrutiny because the corre-
spondence restrictions also infringed on the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of nonprisoners.' ° ' The Martinez Court did not
reach the question of the proper standard of review for inmates' First
Amendment claims. 1
0 2
In four prisoners' rights cases that followed Martinez, the Court
tackled issues implicating prisoners' First and Fourteenth Amend-
92. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 228 (2001).
93. Id. (quotingJones v. N.C. Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 139 (1977) (Marshall,J.,
dissenting) (quoting Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (1 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871))).
94. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
95. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
96. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737-38 (2002) (holding that an unruly prisoner's
Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was handcuffed to a hitching post after
already being subdued). Prisoners also retain such protections as the right to petition the
government for redress of grievances and the right to due process. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84.
97. Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 348.
98. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
99. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84.
100. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 406.
101. Id. at 408-09, 413.
102. See id. at 408 (avoiding the prisoners' First Amendment claims because the case
could be decided on narrower grounds).
20061
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ment claims in earnest.1"3 All four of the prisoners' rights cases-
Block, Bell, Jones, and Pell--declined to impose a heightened standard
of review on the challenged regulations, and instead focused on
whether the regulations were reasonably related to proper goals of
imprisonment or whether the regulations were simply an exaggerated
response on the part of the prison administration.'
0 4
In the 1980s, in Turner v. Safley, the Court developed a standard
of review for prisoners' constitutional claims that struck a balance be-
tween protecting inmates' rights and judicial restraint. 10 5 Turner in-
volved a prisoner class action challenging two prison regulations
limiting correspondence and marriage.10 6 Writing for the majority,
Justice O'Connor established that "when a prison regulation impinges
on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasona-
bly related to legitimate penological interests."'' 7 Justice O'Connor then
suggested four factors to consider to determine the reasonableness of
a regulation: (1) whether there is a "valid, rational connection" be-
tween the regulation and a legitimate governmental interest; (2)
whether there are alternative means of exercising the right open to
prisoners; (3) the impact of accommodating the right on guards,
other inmates, and prison resources; (4) and the absence of ready
alternatives.' The Court's major justification for requiring a defer-
ential reasonable-relationship test as opposed to strict scrutiny was to
avoid unduly burdening prison officials.' 9  Specifically, Justice
O'Connor speculated, strict scrutiny would diminish prison officials'
ability to adopt creative solutions to problems and would unnecessa-
103. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) (upholding prison rule banning con-
tact visits); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (allowing prison regulation restricting in-
mates' ability to receive books unless shipped from bookstores, publishers, or book clubs);
Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (upholding prison rule banning meet-
ings of a prisoner's labor union); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (holding constitu-
tional prison regulation banning face-to-face media interviews).
104. Turner, 482 U.S. at 87.
105. Id. at 85. The Court has justified its policy of exercisingjudicial restraint for prison-
ers' rights cases on the grounds that prison administrators, and not the courts, are best
positioned to deal with problems of prison administration and that prison administration
is the responsibility of the legislative and executive branches, rather than the judiciary. Id.
at 84-85.
106. Id. at 81-82.
107. Id. at 89 (emphasis added). Under Turner, the prisoner bears the burden of dis-
proving the validity of the prison regulation. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 232 (2001).
108. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.
109. Id. at 89.
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rily hamper administrative decision-making based on the possibility
that a court somewhere could discover a less restrictive alternative.' 10
After Turner, the Court applied its reasonable-relationship test to
prisoners' constitutional claims under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. For example, in OLone v. Estate of Shabazz, the Court
applied the four Turner factors to a claim that prison policies prevent-
ing inmates from attending religious services violated the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the First Amendment."' It concluded that the prison's
policies were reasonably related to legitimate goals of incarceration
and were therefore constitutional." 2 In Washington v. Harper, the
Court extended its application of the Turner standard beyond prisoner
cases involving the First Amendment to inmate due-process challenges
under the Fourteenth Amendment.11 In Harper, the Court held that
a prison regulation authorizing the state to override a mentally-ill pris-
oner's refusal of medication satisfied the Turner test and thus did not
violate the Due Process Clause." 4 The Court stressed in Harper that
the Turner standard should apply in every situation where prison
needs implicate prisoners' constitutional rights.' 15
Thirteen years after Harper, however, the Court in Overton v. Baz-
zetta" 6 appeared to modify its broad declaration that Turner applies to
all constitutional claims in the prison context. In Overton, the Court
reviewed a Michigan prison regulation restricting the number of visi-
tors that prisoners could receive."17 Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy noted that inmates do not retain rights inconsistent with
proper incarceration. 11 The Court reasoned that because freedom of
110. Id. The Turner Court held that the correspondence regulation was facially valid but
that the marriage regulation was unconstitutional. Id at 99-100. Justice Stevens, who dis-
sented in part, noted that the reasonableness standard articulated by the majority was
open-ended and would too easily allow courts to uphold regulations restricting prisoners'
First Amendment rights simply by citing potential security risks. Id. at 101 n.1 (Stevens,
Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111. 482 U.S. 342, 349-53 (1987).
112. Id. at 350. In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that a reasonableness standard
for all constitutional challenges in the prison setting is an inadequate measure because
such a standard is too deferential and cannot distinguish among levels of deprivation. Id.
at 356 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting). Two years later, in Thorn-
burgh v. Abbott, the Court again addressed a First Amendment claim in the prison context.
490 U.S. 401 (1989). In Thornburgh, the Court held that a prison regulation enabling
prison administrators to reject incoming publications under certain circumstances was
facially valid under Turner. Id. at 404.
113. 494 U.S. 210, 223-24 (1990).
114. Id. at 227.
115. Id. at 224.
116. 539 U.S. 126 (2003).
117. Id. at 129.
118. Id. at 131.
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association is a right that is necessarily at odds with lawful incarcera-
tion, the Turnerstandard governs.119 Therefore, based on the Court's
clarification in Overton, the Turner test applies when prisoners assert
claims regarding constitutional rights that are incompatible with im-
prisonment, such as free speech and due process.
120
C. The Deliberate-Indifference Standard of Review for
Eighth Amendment Violations in Prisons
In addition to strict scrutiny and the Turner standard, race-based
government action in the prison context may also be subject to the
Court's deliberate-indifference test for prisoners' Eighth Amendment
claims. 21  Although the Court acknowledges that the Constitution
does not require comfortable prisons,122 the Court also recognizes
that prison officials must provide humane conditions of confinement,
which includes taking reasonable measures to guarantee inmate
safety.1
23
In Estelle v. Gamble, the Court first used the term "deliberate indif-
ference" to evaluate a prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim that he
received inadequate medical treatment for a back injury sustained
while engaged in prison work. 124 The Estelle Court held that ordinary
negligence on the part of prison officials does not violate the Eighth
Amendment; rather, only deliberate indifference constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment.
125
Following Estelle, the Court further defined the boundaries of the
deliberate-indifference standard for Eighth Amendment claims. In
Farmer v. Brennan, the Court conclusively defined the level of culpabil-
ity necessary to establish deliberate indifference.1 26  Farmer, a
transsexual, was raped and beaten in his cell by another inmate.
1 27
He subsequently sued prison officials, alleging deliberate indifference
in failing to protect against the risk of physical harm in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. 1 2' Farmer claimed that the prison officials
119. Id. at 131-32.
120. See supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
121. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (clarifying that the deliberate-
indifference standard is a subjective test for prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims against
the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment).
122. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981).
123. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984).
124. 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
125. Id. at 106.
126. 511 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1994).
127. Id. at 829-30.
128. Id. at 830-31.
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knew that the penitentiary environment was dangerous per se and
that, as a transsexual, he would be especially vulnerable to sexual at-
tack.129 Writing for the majority, Justice Souter declared that deliber-
ate indifference amounts to subjective recklessness. 30 Specifically, a
prison official violates the Eighth Amendment if she knows of an ex-
cessive risk to an inmate's health or safety and disregards that risk.13" '
Justice Souter further clarified that the official must not only be aware
of facts from which an inference could be drawn that serious harm is
substantially possible but also actually draw such an inference before
she is found liable under the deliberate-indifference standard.1
3 2
After Farmer, at least two lower courts invoked the deliberate-
indifference standard to hold that the failure of prison officials to take
adequate measures to protect prisoners from violence violated the
Eighth Amendment. In Robinson v. Prunty, for example, the Ninth
Circuit upheld the district court's order denying prison officials' qual-
ified immunity from a prisoner's claim that the officials violated the
Eighth Amendment by failing to consider the risk of racial violence
when releasing a prisoner into a racially integrated exercise yard.'
33
Robinson alleged that he was attacked twice by Mexican-American in-
mates while the guards watched.'33 The Robinson court held that be-
cause the law regarding deliberate indifference was clearly established
at the time of the attacks, qualified immunity was properly denied.
1 5
Similarly, in Jensen v. Clarke, the Eighth Circuit addressed a class
action by inmates challenging a Nebraska prison-system policy of ran-
domly assigning prisoners to double cells. 136 Specifically, the class
contended that by failing to account for the violent propensities of
potential cellmates, prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the
inmates' safety.' 37 Based on the prison officials' knowledge of re-
ported violent incidents, the Jensen court affirmed the district court's
ruling that the prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment. 3 '
129. Id. at 831.
130. Id. at 839-40.
131. Id. at 837.
132. Id. The Farmer Court ultimately remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings under the proper standard for deliberate indifference. Id. at 849. The Court
has often remanded cases for actual application of the standard of review when the appro-
priate standard is in question. E.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 557-58
(1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32 (1992).
133. 249 F.3d 862, 867 (9th Cir. 2001).
134. Id. at 864-65.
135. Id. at 866-67.
136. 94 F.3d 1191, 1193-94 (8th Cir. 1996).
137. Id. at 1195.
138. 1& at 1199.
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III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Johnson v. California,13 9 the United States Supreme Court re-
versed the Ninth Circuit's decision to uphold the CDC's race-based
policy under the deferential Turner standard of review and remanded
the case for further proceedings under a strict-scrutiny standard.
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor began by expressing the
Court's continued commitment to strict scrutiny for review of all gov-
ernment-imposed racial classifications.140 The Court emphasized that
strict scrutiny is important when the justification for the race-based
measures is racial violence in prisons. 141 The Court noted that such
measures could potentially create greater hostility among inmates, or
worse, actually increase racial violence.1 4
2
Next, the Court rejected the deferential Turner standard for use
in reviewing racial classifications in prisons.14  The Court noted that
applying Turner would be inconsistent with the heightened standard
of review the Court used in Lee v. Washington14 and inappropriate
because Turner has only applied to rights inconsistent with the goals of
the penal system.1 45 Unlike certain First Amendment challenges, the
Court reasoned that it need not compromise the right to be free from
racial discrimination for the sake of proper prison administration. 146
To the contrary, the Court argued, racial discrimination damages the
legitimacy and integrity of the criminal justice system. 14 1
The Court ended its analysis by explaining that the Turner stan-
dard would make invidious discrimination easier to defend and there-
fore that strict scrutiny must apply.' 48 Although it refused to defer to
state officials on matters of race, the Court assured the CDC that
prison officials would remain able to serve the compelling interest of
prison security as long as they could demonstrate that a race-based
measure was narrowly tailored to that interest.1 49 The Court, how-
139. 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005).
140. Id. at 1146.
141. Id. at 1147.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1148-51.
144. Id. at 1150.
145. Id. at 1149.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1151. The Court argued that the Turner standard would be inadequate be-
cause Turner would enable prison officials to implement a race-based policy when a race-
neutral practice could accomplish the same result. Id. Furthermore, the Court reasoned,
Turner might even sanction a blanket segregation policy because the risk of racial violence
is present in areas other than the cells. Id.
149. Id. at 1151.
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ever, declined to determine whether the CDC's policy was narrowly
tailored to protect prisoners from racial violence, holding only that
strict scrutiny governs review.150 Instead, the Court remanded the
case to give the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit the first oppor-
tunity to apply the correct standard, justifying its decision by citing
cases that reversed and remanded for the lower court to apply the
correct legal standard for the first time. 1 '
In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg agreed with the majority's
decision to require strict scrutiny. 152 She wrote separately, however,
to express her view that the same standard of review should not neces-
sarily apply to every government-imposed racial classification.15 1 Jus-
tice Ginsburg reasoned that the Court should not rank discriminatory
actions against groups who have historically been denied full citizen-
ship rights alongside remedial measures taken to stamp out discrimi-
nation and its aftereffects. 154 Nevertheless, she concluded that the
CDC's stereotypical classification demanded the heaviest scrutiny.155
Justice Stevens dissented on the grounds that the CDC's race-
based double-cell policy violated the Equal Protection Clause under
any standard of review and should be invalidated outright.1 56 Specifi-
cally, Justice Stevens contended that the CDC failed to present ade-
quate evidence tojustify the policy, which he viewed as overbroad and
based on racial stereotypes. 157 According to Justice Stevens, the CDC
did not have any reason to withhold evidence justifying its policy. 58
In fact, he noted, the CDC never suggested that remanding the case
would be useful for any purpose other than to postpone an unavoid-
able result. 159 Justice Stevens further added that the CDC failed to
consider race-neutral alternatives for protecting inmate security.' 60
Pointing to the CDC's failure to obtain timely pre-sentence reports
and prison records while inmates undergo the reception process, Jus-
tice Stevens explained that without the inmate-specific information
that can be gleaned from such records, prison officials easily run the
risk of housing inmates together who are from the same race but from
150. Id. at 1152.
151. Id. (citing Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 557-58 (1994); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32 (1992)).
152. Id. at 1152 (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1152-53.
155. Id. at 1153.
156. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1153-54.
158. Id. at 1153.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1155-56.
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rival gangs.161 Thus, while acknowledging that remanding the case
would have been appropriate to determine the qualified-immunity is-
sue,Justice Stevens disagreed with the Court's refusal to hold that the
policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. 162
In a dissent joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas maintained
that the Court erred in two major respects. 16' First, he argued that
the Court was mistaken to require strict scrutiny instead of the defer-
ential Turner approach.164 By requiring strict scrutiny, he reasoned,
the majority failed to account for the hardship imposed on prison offi-
cials by subjecting their day-to-day judgments to a court's inexpert and
inflexible review. 165 Second, Justice Thomas argued that the Court
erred in failing to uphold the constitutionality of the CDC's double-
cell assignment policy, asserting that when Turner's four factors are
applied to the record, the CDC's policy is clearly constitutional. 166 Fi-
nally, he also maintained that the CDC's policy could survive strict
scrutiny. 167 Nevertheless, if the CDC's policy is struck down on re-
mand, Justice Thomas concluded, Johnson's victory will come at a
heavy price. 168
IV. ANALYSIS
In Johnson v. California, the United States Supreme Court prop-
erly rejected the Turner standard for racial classifications in the prison
context and insisted on subjecting such classifications to strict scru-
tiny, thereby resolving a conflict between its equal-protection jurispru-
dence and prisoners' rights cases. 169 The Court's limited holding,
however, discouraged prison officials from implementing legitimate
safety measures to prevent racial violence in three respects: first, by
insufficiently addressing the dangers motivating the CDC policy;17 0
161. Id. at 1156-57.
162. Id. at 1157.
163. Id. (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
164. Id. Justice Thomas further argued that the Constitution has always required less in
the prison setting. Id. He noted that there have been several instances in which the Court
grappled with potential violations of fundamental rights and yet deferred to the expertise
and sound judgment of prison administrators. Id.
165. Id. at 1161.
166. Id. at 1163-65.
167. Id. at 1171.
168. Id. at 1172. Justice Thomas citedJohnson's admissions that racial violence was ram-
pant in the California prison system and that he himself feared attack based on his race.
Id. Hence, Justice Thomas warned, if the CDC policy does not survive strict scrutiny on
remand, then "Johnson may well have won a Pyrrhic victory." Id.
169. See infra Parts IV.A.1 and IV.A.2.
170. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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second, by rejecting a deferential component to strict scrutiny in the
prison setting;17 ' and third, by remanding the case rather than decid-
ing outright whether the CDC policy was constitutional. 71 In so do-
ing, the Court potentially subjected prison officials to greater liability
under the Eighth Amendment and exposed prisoners to greater risk
of racial violence.'
73
Rather than require strict scrutiny-and withhold deference-
the Court should have applied strict scrutiny with a measure of defer-
ence to evaluate the constitutionality of the CDC policy like it did in
Grutter v. Bollinger.174 At the very least, the Court should have acknowl-
edged that difficult policy judgments made by prison administrators,
like education officials, warrant a degree of deference. 175 Either ap-
proach would have better protected prisoners' safety and equal-pro-
tection rights without forcing prison administrators to worry about
violating the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments.
A. The Court's Decision to Require Strict Scrutiny Was Consistent with
Precedent, Whereas the Turner Standard Would Have Been
an Inappropriate Departure
1. The Court Properly Required Strict Scrutiny for Judicial Review of
Racial Classifications in Prisons.-By imposing strict scrutiny rather than
the Turner reasonable-relationship test, the Johnson Court remained
true to the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, namely, to pro-
hibit state discrimination based on race, and to its own long-standing
commitment to the eradication of racial discrimination. 76 Like the
exclusion order in Korematsu,177 the Johnson Court properly deemed
the CDC policy suspicious and therefore in need of strict judicial re-
171. See infra Part IV.B.2.
172. See infra Part IV.B.3.
173. See infra Part IV.B.4.
174. See infra Part 1V.C.
175. See infra Part P.C.
176. SeeThe Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873) (providing that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was crafted for the purpose of
protecting blacks from discriminatory state laws); see also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 306-07 (1879) (stating that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to prohibit
discriminatory state laws); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (same).
177. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (noting that restrictions
burdening a single racial group's legal rights should be subject to strict scrutiny); see also
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (mentioning that a
more searching judicial form of review may be necessary for laws that "prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities").
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view. 17 1 Indeed, the CDC never argued that the practice of assigning
inmates to double cells based on race was remedial in nature.
79
Rather, the CDC justified its practice by citing the risk of racial vio-
lence perpetrated by gang members.'8 0 Thus, just as the Korematsu
exclusion order warranted the strictest review because the order bur-
dened a group's civil rights,"'1 so too was it necessary to strictly scruti-
nize the CDC policy to ensure that the practice was not "motivated by
an invidious purpose." 182
Likewise, the Court in Johnson appropriately rejected the CDC's
argument that the reception-center housing policy was exempt from
strict scrutiny because the policy was neutral and did not burden one
racial group more than another."8 3 As the Court clarified in Loving v.
Virginia, racial classifications that burden and benefit racial groups
equally are still subject to strict scrutiny,1 8 4 and thus the CDC policy
should be reviewed under strict scrutiny even if it was "neutral."8 5
Furthermore, as the Johnson Court pointed out, the crux of the CDC's
argument was essentially the notion of "separate but equal," '8 6 which
was repudiated in Brown v. Board of Education.87
Even if the CDC policy could somehow be characterized as reme-
dial, the Johnson Court's decision to impose strict scrutiny would still
be consistent with precedent. 1 8 As the Court explained in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson, strict scrutiny is essential to properly distin-
guish benign from discriminatory classifications."8 9 Based on the cate-
gorical rule articulated in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe-ia that all
government-imposed racial classifications, whether beneficial or bur-
densome, are subject to strict scrutiny, 9 0 the Court correctly sub-
178. SeeJohnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1146 (2005) (stating that strict scrutiny is
necessary because racial classifications raise concerns of illegitimate motivation).
179. See id. at 1153 (Ginsburg,J., concurring) (noting the absence of any pretense that
the purpose of the CDC's policy was to fix inequalities).
180. Id. at 1144 (majority opinion).
181. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
182. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1146.
183. Id. at 1146-47.
184. 388 U.S. 1, 8, 11 (1967).
185. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1147.
186. Id.; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) (establishing the "sepa-
rate but equal" doctrine).
187. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
188. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (imposing strict
scrutiny on remedial measures).
189. 488 U.S. 467, 493 (1989).
190. 515 U.S. at 227.
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jected the CDC policy to strict scrutiny.' In light of the Court's
struggles with the proper standard of review for affirmative-action
measures, 9 2 any standard besides strict scrutiny would have been a
surprising result.193 Moreover, in the prison setting where the govern-
ment has enormous power and there is great potential for abuse, the
most rigorous standard of review should govern.' 94
Finally, the Court's decision to require strict scrutiny in Johnson
was consistent with its decision in Lee v. Washington, in which the
Court applied heightened scrutiny to a race-based measure in the
prison setting.' 95 The Lee Court's placement of the burden of proof
on prison officials to justify the racial-segregation policy, as well as the
"particularized circumstances" exception emphasized by the concur-
rence, indicate that the policy was indeed subject to heightened scru-
tiny.196  Also, in subsequent cases, lower courts accepted the
proposition that racial classifications in prisons warrant heightened
scrutiny.'97
2. The Court Appropriately Rejected the Turner Standard for Equal-
Protection Challenges.-After recognizing that strict scrutiny was the cor-
rect standard of review for racial classifications in prisons, the Johnson
Court properly rejected the reasonable-relationship test of Turner v.
191. See Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1146 (reviewing Adarand, Grutter, and Croson and holding
that strict scrutiny governed review of racial classifications in prisons).
192. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (plurality opin-
ion) (suggesting that strict scrutiny is required for all racial classifications); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980) (plurality opinion) (purporting to develop a new two-
part test for remedial classifications); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74
(1986) (plurality opinion) (returning to a strict-scrutiny requirement for remedial race-
based measures); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990) (requiring inter-
mediate scrutiny as opposed to strict scrutiny for racial classifications imposed by the fed-
eral government).
193. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (insisting on strict scrutiny for a
remedial racial classification in the school-admissions context).
194. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1150.
195. See id. at 1147 (stating that the Court applied a heightened standard of review in
Lee).
196. SeeJohnson v. California, 336 F.3d 1117, 1118 (9th Cir. 2003) (Fergusen, Preger-
son, Nelson, & Reinhardt, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that
strict scrutiny was applied in Lee because the burden was placed on prison officials to justify
their policies and further pointing out that later cases construed Lee as applying a height-
ened standard of review).
197. See, e.g., Sockwell v. Phelps, 20 F.3d 187, 191-92 (5th Cir. 1994) (relying on Lee for
the notion that a greater justification than a vague concern about racial violence was neces-
sary before upholding a racial-segregation policy); see also Black v. Lane, 824 F.2d 561, 562-
63 (7th Cir. 1987) (using strict scrutiny to review a prisoner's racial-discrimination claim);
United States v. Wyandotte County, 480 F.2d 969, 971 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that a
racial-segregation policy is not legitimately justified by unclear racial-violence concerns).
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Safy.198 As Block, Bell, Jones, and Pell indicate, the Turner standard
grew out of the Court's efforts to accommodate certain First Amend-
ment and due-process challenges brought by prisoners,19 9 not equal-
protection claims such as the one brought byJohnson. 20  Turner itself
did not address an equal-protection challenge, nor did it involve a
racial classification. 21  Despite the Court's proclamation in Washing-
ton v. Harper that Turner applies to all constitutional claims brought by
prisoners, 20 2 the Court appeared to backtrack in Overton v. Bazzetta,
implying that the Turner standard of review only applies to rights in-
compatible with proper incarceration.2 13 Unlike the First Amend-
ment challenge addressed in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,20 4 Johnson's
Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from racial discrimination is
consistent with proper incarceration and should therefore remain un-
fettered behind prison walls.20 5 As the Johnson Court noted, for the
very same reasons, the Turner standard has not been applied to prison-
ers' Eighth Amendment claims.206 Therefore, in rejecting the Turner
standard and imposing strict scrutiny for racial classifications in pris-
ons, the Court acted in accordance with established precedent and
provided clear resolution to the conflict between the Court's equal-
protection and Turner lines of precedent.
2 7
B. Johnson 's Limited Holding May Trap Administrators Between
Violations of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments
While the Court in Johnson properly required that prison-based
racial classifications be reviewed using strict scrutiny rather than Tur-
198. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1151.
199. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) (challenging prohibition of contact
visits); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (claiming restriction on inmates' ability to re-
ceive books unless shipped from bookstores, publishers, or book clubs was unconstitu-
tional); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (challenging prohibition of
prisoners' labor union meetings); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (claiming that
forbidding certain media interviews was unconstitutional).
200. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1145.
201. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (addressing prison regulations that restrict
inmate marriage and correspondence).
202. 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990).
203. 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003).
204. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (denying claim involving the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment); see also Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223
(2001) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to regulation restricting inmate correspon-
dence); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) (denying challenge to prison regula-
tion based on First Amendment concerns).
205. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1149.
206. Id.
207. See supra Parts II.A-B.
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nets reasonable-relationship test, 208 the Court's narrow holding effec-
tively discouraged prison officials from preventing racial violence and
endangered prisoners in three respects. 20 9 First, the Court's charac-
terization of the CDC policy failed to acknowledge the real dangers in
the California prison system, thus sending a message to lower courts
and CDC officials that the policy probably would not survive strict
scrutiny. Second, the Court's express rejection of a deferential
component to strict scrutiny for racial classifications in prisons further
suggested that such policies would be difficult to defend under the
Fourteenth Amendment."' Third, the Court's choice to remand the
case without applying strict scrutiny to the CDC policy left prison ad-
ministrators with no guidance as to how to develop a policy that is
both constitutional and effective.212 As a result, prison administrators
may become liable under the Eighth Amendment for demonstrating
deliberate indifference to prisoners' safety.
2 13
1. The Court Did Not Sufficiently Acknowledge the Real and Unique
Dangers in the California Prison System That Motivated the Policy.-AJ-
though the Johnson Court purported to only determine the proper
standard of review for racial classifications in prisons and not the con-
stitutionality of the CDC policy,214 its dismissive description of the pol-
icy belied its statement of purpose. 215  The majority briefly
acknowledged the CDC's "asserted rationale" that the purpose of the
policy was to prevent racial violence 62 1 but mostly focused on the fact
that the CDC policy was unwritten and that most of the other state
and federal prison systems operate without a temporary racial-segrega-
tion policy in reception centers y.2 1  In glossing over the CDC's justifi-
cations, however, the Court ignored the serious danger of racial
violence rampant in the prison system in general and California's pris-
ons in particular.2 1 8 Prisons are undoubtedly among the most racist
208. See supra Parts IV.A.
209. See infra Part IV.B.
210. See infra Part IV.B.1.
211. See infra Part LV.B.2.
212. See infta Part LV.B.3.
213. See infra Part IV.B.4.
214. Johnson, 125 S. Ct at 1144.
215. See id. at 1169 (Thomas & Scalia,JJ., dissenting) (noting that the majority's descrip-
tion of particular features of the CDC policy is irrelevant because it has no bearing on the
question of the proper standard of review).
216. Id. at 1144-45 (majority opinion).
217. Id. at 1148.
218. See id. at 1162 (Thomas & Scalia,JJ., dissenting) (arguing that the majority does not
consider the problems of racial violence that must be addressed by prison officials).
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and racially segregated places in America.21 9 Contributing to the
heightened racial tension is the fact that prisons are dominated by
gangs organized along racial lines.22° Many of the predominant racial
gangs-for example, the Black Guerilla Family, Aryan Brotherhood,
and Mexican Mafia-originated in California correctional facilities.
22 1
Gang members in the California prison system routinely murder and
rape other prisoners who are not gang members and interfering
guards. 222 Such violence presents an enormous threat and challenge
to prison administrators.
223
The Johnson majority, however, declined to address the magni-
tude of the racial-gang problem and instead only highlighted features
of the policy that cast doubt on its motivation.224 In so doing, the
majority sent a strong message to lower courts and CDC officials that
the policy should be found unconstitutional. 225 The Court's decision
is thus likely to discourage prison officials from implementing safety
measures necessary to address the very real danger of racial violence
in the California prison system. 26
2. The Court's Rejection of a Deferential Component to Strict Scrutiny
Expresses to Prison Officials That Race-Based Policies Will Have Trouble Sur-
viving Judicial Review.-In addition to disregarding the CDC's motiva-
tions for the temporary racial-segregation practice,227 the Johnson
Court also distorted the proper application of strict scrutiny in the
219. ALAN ELSNER, GATES OF INJUSTICE: THE CRISIS IN AMERICA'S PRISONS 36 (2004). As
Elsner notes, "Race permeates every aspect of prison life, and prison authorities take great
care to keep ethnic groups apart to avoid bloodshed .... Whenever members of rival
groups cross paths, there is a danger of violence." Id. at 37.
220. Id. at 37. According to prison experts, prison gangs are "the most significant real-
ity" in prisoners' lives. Jonathan A. Willens, Structure, Content and the Exigencies of War:
American Prison Law After Twenty-Five Years 1962-1987, 37 Am. U. L. REV. 41, 56 (1987) (quot-
ing James B. Jacobs, Street Gangs Behind Bars, in THE PURSUIT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 29, 33
(Gordon Hawkins & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 1984)).
221. ELSNER, supra note 219, at 38-39. Not surprisingly, California ranks among the top
three prison systems dominated by race-based gangs. Willens, supra note 220, at 56 n.69.
222. Willens, supra note 220, at 55-56.
223. Id. at 57-58; Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1162 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
224. See Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1148 (describing the policy as unwritten and questioning
the CDC's statement that two other states have similar policies). But see id. at 1155 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (addressing the substance of the CDC's justifications for the racial-
segregation policy and nonetheless finding the evidence unconvincing).
225. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Civil Rights Victory for Prisoners, TRIAL, May 2005, at 77
(arguing that even though the Johnson Court remanded the case for the application of
strict scrutiny, Justice O'Connor's opinion suggests that routine racial segregation of pris-
oners is unconstitutional).
226. See Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1162-63 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (describing the
dangers in the California prison system).
227. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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prison context. Although strict scrutiny is the correct standard of re-
view, 2 2 8 the Court erroneously ignored the merits of the CDC's argu-
ment that prison administrators are owed a measure of deference in
their expert judgments, and it improperly based its decision on non-
penal contexts in which the case for deference is trumped by race,
such as in the peremptory challenge or redistricting contexts.229 The
Court's decision to not extend deference to prison officials was unnec-
essary because the Court properly rejected the Turner test on other
grounds.23 °
Moreover, the Johnson Court's refusal to defer to official expertise
was perplexing because precedent allowed for such deference. 231 In
Adarand, the Court emphasized that the fundamental purpose of strict
scrutiny is to account for "relevant differences."23 2 As the Court fur-
ther explained in Grutter, context is important when applying strict
scrutiny and deferring to experts does not dilute the standard.233 As
noted by commentators, the Grutter Court's functional rather than
mechanical approach to strict scrutiny, evidenced by its inclusion of
deference, was consistent with the Court's statements in prior cases
that strict scrutiny is necessary to determine motivations for race-
based policies and is not necessarily fatal.2 34 Furthermore, if tradi-
tional deference to university officials warranted strict scrutiny with
deference in Grutter, the Court's long-standing tradition of deferring
to prison administrators as evidenced in the Turner line of cases cer-
tainly merits the same respect. 2 5
Precedent aside, the Johnson Court's rejection of a deferential ap-
proach to strict scrutiny for racial classifications in prisons also gives
rise to practical difficulties. The Johnson Court held that such classifi-
cations would be subject to strict scrutiny, yet refused to account for
prison officials' expert judgments. 23 6 Prison officials, not courts, are
228. See supra Part IV.A.
229. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1150.
230. See id. at 1151 (rejecting the Turner test because it could sanction a blanket segrega-
tion policy).
231. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny but deferring
to university officials' expertise).
232. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995).
233. Grutter, 529 U.S. at 328.
234. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, In Defense of Deference, 21 CoNsT.
COMMENT. 133, 165-67 (2004) (defending the Court's decision in Grutter to defer to univer-
sity officials in its application of strict scrutiny and arguing that such an approach was
consistent with precedent).
235. See Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1168 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (reasoning that if
deference was warranted in Grutter, deference was certainly warranted in the prison
context).
236. Id. at 1150 (majority opinion).
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best situated to make difficult judgments related to prison administra-
tion.2 3 7 As the Court warned in Turner, subjecting prison officials to
an inflexible standard of review will seriously impede their ability to
address safety problems and will put courts in the position of deter-
mining the best solution to problems of prison administration. 23 The
Johnson Court has done exactly this by imposing an even stricter ver-
sion of strict scrutiny than was required in Grutter, Gratz, or
Adarand.23 9
3. The Court's Decision to Remand Without Evaluating the Constitu-
tionality of the CDC Policy Leaves Prison Officials Without a Sense of Consti-
tutionally Permissible Racial-Violence Policies.-After announcing that
strict scrutiny was the proper standard of review, the Johnson Court
improperly remanded the case to allow the lower court to apply the
standard to the CDC policy for the first time.24° In declining the op-
portunity to determine whether the policy 'was a narrowly tailored
means to address prison security,241 the Court missed a chance to elu-
cidate the characteristics of a narrowly tailored policy to prevent racial
violence, thus increasing the danger that prison officials will abandon
safety measures already in place. The Court supported its decision to
remand by citing two cases that it remanded to allow a lower court to
apply the correct standard.242 The supporting cases suggest that re-
mand is appropriate when the parties have not sufficiently briefed or
argued under the particular standard that the Court deems control-
ling.243 Unlike the parties in those cases, however, the parties in John-
son clearly recognized that strict scrutiny was potentially applicable
and briefed the issue accordingly. 244
Moreover, at least three Justices in Johnson believed there was
enough evidence to determine the constitutionality of the CDC policy
237. Id. at 1160 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
238. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
239. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny but deferring
to university officials' expertise); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (same); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying a version of strict scrutiny that
takes context into account).
240. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1152.
241. Id.
242. See id. (citing Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
243. Gottshall 512 U.S. at 558; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31.
244. See Brief for Respondents at 37-43, Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005)
(No. 03-636) (arguing that even under strict-scrutiny analysis, the CDC's temporary-hous-
ing policy is constitutional); see also Brief for Petitioner at 15-24,Johnson v. California, 125
S. Ct. 1141 (2005) (No. 03-636) (contending that strict scrutiny applies to the CDC policy).
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based on the record rather than remand the case. 24 5 As Justice Ste-
vens noted, the CDC had no reason to withhold evidence supporting
the policy and never argued that additional factual development
would have any use other than to delay the inevitable.246 Although
advocating for the applicability of the Turner test rather than strict
scrutiny, Justices Thomas and Scalia believed that the CDC policy sur-
vived Turner and was constitutional on the current record.2 4 7
Although the majority conceded that prison security is a compel-
ling interest,248 the Johnson Court's refusal to evaluate whether the
CDC's policy was narrowly tailored leaves prison officials in the
dark.249 In choosing to remand the case, the Court provided prison
officials with little guidance as to the characteristics of a policy that
would survive strict scrutiny beyond its vague warning that policies
must be demonstrably narrowly tailored. 25 0 Thus, to strengthen pris-
oners' Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Court actually increased
the risk that prison officials will abandon safety policies implicating
race, thereby contradicting its assertion that prison security is a com-
pelling governmental interest.25'
4. Johnson Creates Greater Liability for Prison Officials Under the
Eighth Amendment.-By disregarding the dangers motivating the CDC
policy, rejecting a deferential approach to strict scrutiny, and remand-
ing rather than deciding constitutionality outright,252 the Court cre-
ated a disincentive to regulate racial violence that could subject prison
officials to lawsuits under the Eighth Amendment 2 53 Specifically,
245. See Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1153 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the CDC had no
reason to withhold evidence justifying its policy); see also id. at 1165, 1171 (Thomas &
Scalia,JJ., dissenting) (arguing that the CDC policy is constitutional under the Turner test).
246. Id. at 1153 (Stevens. J., dissenting).
247. See id. at 1163-65 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that based on Turner's
four factors, the CDC policy was constitutional). Note, however, thatJustices Thomas and
Scalia agreed with the majority that if strict scrutiny was to govern review, the case should
be remanded out of fairness to the CDC. Id. at 1172.
248. Id. at 1150 (majority opinion).
249. See id. at 1152 (refusing to determine whether the CDC policy was valid under strict
scrutiny).
250. See id. at 1151 (dismissing the CDC's concerns that strict scrutiny will handcuff
prison officials with the response that policies will only be invalidated if they are not nar-
rowly tailored to address prison safety).
251. See id. at 1150 (reaffirming that prison security and discipline are compelling gov-
ernmental interests).
252. See supra Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.2, and IV.B.3.
253. See Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1170 (Thomas & Scalia,JJ., dissenting) (suggesting that the
Court's holding could subject prison officials to suit under the Eighth Amendment deliber-
ate-indifference standard for ignoring dangerous conditions).
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under the deliberate-indifference standard of Farmer v. Brennan,254 Es-
telle v. Gamble2 55 and the Court's Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence, 256 prison officials could be held liable for doing exactly what
the Johnson majority urges: disregarding race when assigning inmates
to cells despite a risk of racial violence.2 5 7 Justice Thomas raised this
point in his dissent, arguing that the majority placed prison officials in
an impossible position.2 5 8 Because CDC officials have openly admit-
ted that random double-cell assignment would create a "substantial
risk of serious harm," Justice Thomas predicted that if prison officials
housed prisoners indiscriminately without consideration of race, such
conduct clearly could be deemed deliberately indifferent.
259
Indeed, the Court in Johnson should have recognized that prison-
ers have already brought Eighth Amendment claims against prison of-
ficials for deliberate indifference to the risk of violence. In Robinson v.
Prunty, the prisoner charged California prison officials with failure to
consider the risk of violence when they sent him into an integrated
exercise yard.2 60 Similarly, in Jensen v. Clarke, integrated housing in
double cells sparked an Eighth Amendment challenge to the safety of
such a policy.261 Should CDC prison officials modify or eliminate the
existing temporary housing policy to prevent lawsuits under the Four-
teenth Amendment, an increase in Eighth Amendment deliberate-
indifference lawsuits against those same officials could ensue.
C. The Court Should Have Applied a Deferential Version of Strict Scrutiny
to the CDC Policy or at Least Acknowledged a Measure of
Deference to Prison Administrators When Describing
the Strict-Scrutiny Test
The Johnson Court's rejection of a deferential component to strict
scrutiny for prison-based racial classifications was inconsistent with its
decision in Grutter.26 2 Instead of withholding deference and remand-
254. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
255. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
256. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (applying the deliberate-indifference
standard and holding that a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights were violated); Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981) (finding that a prison practice of double-celling in-
mates is not cruel and unusual).
257. Id. at 758-59; see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984) (stating that
prison officials need to ensure the safety of inmates).
258. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1170 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
259. Id.
260. 249 F.3d 862, 865 (9th Cir. 2001).
261. 94 F.3d 1191, 1193-94 (8th Cir. 1996).
262. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (deferring to university officials
when applying strict scrutiny).
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ing, the Court should have followed Grutter by applying strict scrutiny
to the CDC policy while deferring to prison officials' expertise. 263 If
the Court had applied strict scrutiny to the CDC policy, prison offi-
cials would know better how to legitimately combat racial violence in
their institutions, just like university administrators have a stronger
sense of constitutionally permissible admissions policies after Grutter
and Gratz. 26 4 Whether the Court agreed with Justice Stevens that the
CDC policy violated the Equal Protection Clause,265 or with Justices
Thomas and Scalia that the policy was constitutional, 266 either result
would have provided more direction to prison officials seeking to ef-
fectively protect prisoners from racial violence without violating the
Constitution.
Even if the Johnson Court was convinced that out of fairness to
California, the case should be remanded,267 the Court should have
made it clear that deference to prison officials, like deference to uni-
versity officials, was warranted in the application of strict scrutiny to
racial classifications in prisons.268 In fact, prior to the decision in John-
son, one scholar predicted that the Court could potentially invoke
Grutter's "contextual strict scrutiny" in Johnson and the result would be
that the temporary segregation practice is upheld.26" As Justice
Thomas noted in his dissent, if deference is warranted in the educa-
tion context, deference is certainly deserved in the prison setting be-
cause the Court knows even less about administering prisons than it
does educational institutions.270 Moreover, as Justice O'Connor
stressed in Grutter, affording a degree of deference does not diminish
the overall effectiveness of strict scrutiny.27' Incorporating deferential
263. See Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1168 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (noting that the
majority's refusal to acknowledge deference to prison administrators contradicts its ap-
proach in Grutter).
264. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334, 337 (noting the highly individualized consideration
evident in the University of Michigan's Law School admissions policy); see also Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (finding that the University of Michigan's undergradu-
ate admissions policy was not narrowly tailored because it did not take into account individ-
ual considerations before automatically granting additional points).
265. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1153 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 1163 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
267. See id. at 1152 (majority opinion) (supporting its decision to remand with case law).
268. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (explaining that strict scrutiny was not less strict when
deferring to the expert judgments of university officials).
269. Angelo N. Ancheta, Contextual Strict Scrutiny and Race-Conscious Policy Making, 36
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 21, 38 (2004).
270. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1168 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
271. Grutter, 538 U.S. at 328. But see id. at 362 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the majority's deference to the law school was unprecedented and antithetical to
strict scrutiny); id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (contending that the majority distorted
strict scrutiny, undermining the test as well as precedent).
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language into the opinion would have better assured prison officials
that their expertise will be factored into the analysis.272 Had the John-
son Court evaluated the CDC's policy with the same deferential appli-
cation of strict scrutiny it used in Grutter, or at the very least noted that
deference should be afforded to prison administrators when strict
scrutiny is applied to racial classifications in prisons, prison security
would not have been swept aside in the interest of protecting inmates
from racial discrimination.273
V. CONCLUSION
In Johnson v. California, the United States Supreme Court ex-
pressly adopted strict scrutiny for racial classifications in prisons, re-
jected the Turner standard for such measures, and declined to decide
whether the CDC's specific policy was constitutional.2 74 The Court's
decision to impose strict scrutiny was consistent with precedent and
the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment. 275 Nevertheless, the Court
also downplayed the dangers motivating the CDC policy, rejected a
deferential strict-scrutiny approach, and refused to decide the policy's
constitutionality. 276 In so doing, the Court inadvertently discouraged
prison officials from taking legitimate measures to tackle problems of
racial violence, thus exposing them to greater liability under the
Eighth Amendment and putting prisoners at risk.2 7  The Court
should have applied a more deferential version of strict scrutiny to the
policy in a manner similar to Grutter or at least clarified that a measure
of deference to prison administrators would be appropriate for
prison-based racial classifications.2 78 Either approach would have bet-
ter protected prisoners from racial discrimination without deterring
prison officials from addressing racial violence. 279
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272. Id. at 328 (majority opinion) (deferring to university officials' expert judgments in
the complex educational realm).
273. See Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1157 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (disagreeing with
the Court's opinion on the grounds that the majority is concerned with protecting prison-
ers from racial discrimination while California is concerned with their safety).
274. Id. at 1148-49, 1152 (majority opinion).
275. See supra Part IV.A.
276. See supra Part IV.B.
277. See supra Part 1V.B.
278. See supra Part IV.C.
279. See supra Part IV.C.
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